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Agricultural Trade Rules and Climate Change Commitments 
Abstract 
Climate change – among its many other challenges – also impacts on conditions of 
competition along the whole food value chain. This article posits that many mitigation and 
adaptation policies imply a differentiation between otherwise identical products with different 
climate footprints. Where imports are affected, there is a potential for trade frictions. The 
main issue appears to be a climate-smart treatment of so-called ‚non-product-related like 
products.‘ Now that national governments start implementing their commitments under the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, they have to closely look at the trade and investment 
impact of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). The NDC presently available 
remain silent on concrete measures involving product differentiation according to footprint 
differences, by way of border adjustment measures, subsidies, prohibitions, or restrictions. 
The non-discrimination principle enshrined in the multilateral trading system can be a 
problem for such differentiations. No climate-smart agricultural measures have as yet been 
notified to the WTO. But several renewable energy programmes have been found to violate 
WTO rules. Potential problems could arise, for instance, from differentiating tariffs, import 
restrictions or taxes according to climate footprint. Conditions of competition might even be 
affected by labels signalling products with a bigger footprint, or through subsidies and 
incentives compensating domestic producers subject to emissions reductions, prohibitions, 
and input restrictions. A second major problem lies in the way the Paris Agreement and the 
WTO address the Development Dimension. In the Paris Agreement the Development 
Dimension is addressed by the notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), 
leaving basically all Parties free on how to take development into account in their NDC. On 
the other side, the so-called 'Special and Differentiated Treatment' (SDT) foreseen in all 
WTO agreements for developing country products and services appears incapable to deal 
with the global impact of all emissions, regardless of their origin, or with the negative impact 
on developing country exports to climate-smart markets in developed countries. 
In conclusion we suggest that a review of the climate-relevant trade and investment rules is 
necessary at the international level, involving climate, agriculture and trade regulators, 
supported by scientific, economic and legal expertise. The purpose of this review is to avoid 
litigation jeopardising the implementation of the Paris Agreement. At the same time, such a 
review must be wide-ranging, because the objective is to ensure maximum policy space for 
climate mitigation and adaptation without negatively impacting on other countries, or unduly 
restricting trade and investment, especially in poor developing countries. Last but not least, 
this intergovernmental and inter-institutional review is urgent, because the results should 
provide as quickly as possible the legal security necessary for regulators, NDC developments 
and reviews, and international standard-setting processes.
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List of Acronyms 
  
AoA Agreement on Agriculture (WTO) 
ADP Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Antidumping) 
AFOLU Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Uses 
BAM Border Adjustment Measures (e.g. Border Tax Adjustments in WTO) 
CBDR 
(CBDRRC) Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (and Respective Capabilities) 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CER Certified Emission Reduction (units) 
COP Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC) 
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
ETS Emission Trading Schemes 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994 
GHG Greenhouse Gases1 
GIS Green Investment Scheme 
GPA Agreement on Government Procurement 
IET International Emissions Trading 
IPPC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
ISDS Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
LIC Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
MFN Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 
(INDC) 
NDC (Initial) Nationally Determined Contributions 
NFIDC Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform 
Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations 
NT National Treatment 
NTM/NTB Non-Tariff Measures/Barriers 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OIE Office International des Epizooties 
PPM Production and Processing Methods 
PSI Agreement on Preshipment Inspection 
R&D Research, (Extension) and Development 
RoO Agreement on Rules of Origin 
RTA Regional Trade Agreement 
Safeg Agreement on Safeguards 
Schedules Geneva (1995) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
SCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
SDG Sustainable Development Goals 
SDT Special and Differentiated Treatment 
SPS Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
TBT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
TFA Trade Facilitation Agreement 
TRIMS Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures 
1 Here comprising the following gases: Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), Nitrogen trifluoride 
(NF3) (Source: Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, December 2012, Article 1, Paragraph B) 
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TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
TFA Agreement on Trade Facilitation (2014) 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series 
WHO World Health Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 
WTO 
Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
VAL Agreement on Implementation of Article VII (Customs Valuation) 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1. Introduction 
On 12 December 2015 the world at large feted the successful conclusion of the Paris 
Agreement.2 Yet, scarce attention was paid to the legal implications of the Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDC) which each party is individually committed to submit, and 
progressively update, under Article 3 of this agreement.3 This lack of attention can be 
explained by the virtual absence of indications on how individual countries are to reduce 
their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG).4 Negotiations had focused on the formulation of 
the 'top-down' commitment of all parties to address climate change, on the overall reduction 
targets, and on the technology and finance transfers required by developing countries. The 
'bottom-up' obligations are basically to design NDC which will progressively mitigate global 
warming, and to account for delivery and performance. 
The discretion enjoyed by all NDC under the Paris Agreement is greater than that of its 
predecessor agreements. As will be shown, this implementation freedom also applies to the 
way each party has to take into account the development dimension in the formulation of its 
NDC. The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
(CBDRRC) has been laid down in Article 2.2.5 In addition to the development concerns, 
numerous other objectives must also be considered such as the sustainability of 
development, human rights, health, migration and gender equality – again, without clearly 
formulated indications of the implementation modalities.6 
Within these basic and complex commitments, at this stage the Paris Agreement offers 
nearly total latitude for implementation. For the time being, it completely lacks common 
standards, enforcement mechanisms, or sanctions for non-compliance. This was different for 
2  Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). UNTS 8 July 2016, Chapter XXVII-7-d, Registration Number 54113. Downloadead on 5 
September 2017 at https://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php. 
3  Article 3: As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all 
Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts […] with the view to achieving the 
purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression 
over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective 
implementation of this Agreement. 
4  Article 4.13: Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions. In accounting 
for anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined contributions, 
Parties shall promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability 
and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double counting, in accordance with guidance adopted 
by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement. 
 Article 4.14: In the context of their nationally determined contributions, when recognizing and 
implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and removals, Parties should 
take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance under the Convention, in the light of 
the provisions of paragraph 13 of this Article. 
5 ‚This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.‘ (emphasis 
added) 
6 For example, Preamble Indent 11 lists no less than a dozen concerns and objectives having to guide 
climate change action: 
 ‚Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when 
taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on 
human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, 
children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as 
well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.‘ 
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the UNFCCC predecessor agreement, the Kyoto Protocol (2007), which described in some 
detail both domestic and international Joint Implementation measures like the Emission 
Trading Schemes (ETS)7 and their joint mechanism International Emissions Trading (IET),8 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),9 the Green Investment Scheme (GIS),10 or the 
Border Adjustment Measures (BAM).11 The Paris Agreement contains no implementation 
tools, and foresees no specific mechanisms for joint implementation such as ETS and CDM; it 
leaves the choice – and the responsibility to respect international trade and investment rules 
– to the parties.12 The problem with this freedom to regulate under 'Paris' consists, as will be 
shown below, in the justification under international treaty law of WTO rules violations such 
as in GATT-Article XX (General Exceptions) and on the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).13  
The Parties to the Paris Agreement do intend to work on standard-setting, including for 
agriculture. The October 2017 Decision at COP23 to 'address issues related to agriculture' 
can be seen as a first step for the commitment enshrined in the Agreement to 'progressively' 
improve NDC in five-year steps, and not to scale back existing commitments (UNFCCC/IPCC 
2017). The monitoring mechanism built into this ratchet clause definitely lends some force to 
the review and improvement process. 
The complexity of climate action is daunting, especially for agriculture. But this does not 
mitigate the basic commitment of all participating countries to take action, regardless of their 
level of development. The most relevant term for this article is differentiation. Climate expert 
Lavanya Rajamani has rightly noted that the Paris agreement 
operationalizes the CBDRRC principle not by tailoring commitments to categories 
of Parties as the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol do, but by tailoring differentiation to 
the specificities of each of the Durban pillars – mitigation, adaptation, finance, 
technology, capacity-building and transparency.14 
In a trade perspective, while all countries and regions are affected by climate change, Paris 
signatories will have to formulate their NDC for each of these pillars and in line with their 
specific situation. In order to meet its contribution to the global warming limitation target, 
Singapore with less than one thousand heads of cattle will have other emission reduction 
priorities than Canada with one million dairy cows. Countries where agriculture has a large 
7 Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC specifically allows emissions trading where countries 
are committed to limitation and reduction of their emissions under Article 3 of that agreement. 
8 IET was foreseen in the context of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as a 
possibility for the implementation of national Kyoto obligations to occur between participating 
countries (Carbon Trust, 2009, p. 24) 
9 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the Flexible Mechanisms defined in Article 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol. It is the legal basis for emissions reduction projects generating Certified Emission 
Reduction units (CERs) which may be traded in ETS. 
10 GIS was designed as a voluntary option for trading surplus allowances (AAUs) under the Kyoto 
Protocol, thereby achieving additional environmental benefits. 
11 For a good description of the various Kyoto Protocol-related instruments see Carbon Trust (2009, p. 
20ss). 
12 As a first step, on 14 November 2017, the COP23 decided to launch a process of identification of 
'issues relating to agriculture' (UNFCCC/IPCC 2017); cf. Section 5 in fine. 
13 UNTS, vol. 1155, p. 331 
14 Rajamani (2016) p.27 (emphasis added) 
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footprint, in relative or in absolute terms, can hardly avoid climate action in respect of their 
agricultural policies. What then does the Paris Agreement imply for the formulation of 
climate-smart agricultural reforms? What normative value will its broad commitments have 
for the formulation of NDC in view of political opportunities, financial, domestic and foreign 
investment and competition aspects? Can the absence of agreed mechanisms, and of 
production and processing standards, lead to a haphazard, chaotic implementation at the 
national level – without the legal security afforded under treaty law to measures complying 
with international standards? What normative value can vague standards such as 'implied' 
carbon content have? Is this just a matter of trade-impact-neutral promotion of food 
production with a reduced footprint? 
This article tries to answer these questions at the interface between climate change 
mitigation and adaptation measures and trade rules. The hypothesis which will be developed 
here is that border measures and agricultural subsidies differentiating according to different 
product or process footprints may face WTO-compatibility problems, especially where they 
are not clearly based on mandatory international standards. 
The interaction between Paris and WTO is analysed in the following order.  
Section Two recalls the various national and international agricultural policy tools which can 
be used for climate change mitigation programmes. We list these measures in a ‚Climate 
Change Agricultural Tool Box‘. Section Three analyses these tools by describing the basic 
rules under WTO Law potentially applying to such measures in general, and specifically for 
agriculture. We also compare the development dimension as it is addressed under the Paris 
Agreement and in the WTO, respectively, and add a few considerations on Regional Trade 
Agreements. With this background, Section Four examines the main patterns described in 
recent literature, and emerging from the available INDC and NDC, in the light of the most 
relevant WTO rules and case law. This examination shows the potential conflicts of these 
measures in the light of the relevant general non-discrimination rules and non-specific 
commitments of the WTO, including existing or possibly required flexibilities, exceptions, 
exemptions, interpretations, amendments and waivers. 
The conclusions in Section Five summarise the main problems potentially arising under 
relevant trade rules for the implementation of the Paris Agreement in the field of agriculture. 
We then propose an intergovernmental and horizontal review of these issues. Finally, we 
outline a number of possible solutions, avoiding litigation and securing non-trade distorting 
avenues. 
2. A ‚Climate Change Tool Box‘ for Agriculture 
A very large number of different measures can be considered for the implementation of 
(more or less) climate-smart agricultural policies and practices, including new production and 
enhanced productivity technologies, science, education and extension, investment and trade 
measures. Whether and which of these measures effectively and efficiently reduce GHG 
emissions will be the essence of the NDC reviewing and reporting process established by the 
Paris Agreement. 
At present, there is no internationally agreed list of such measures, and their efficiency and 
effectiveness can be subject to doubts. Even the smartest agricultural economists may be at 
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pains to identify measures with an exclusive contribution to GHG reductions, or to quantify 
the respective correlation with the Paris and other policy objectives. Moreover, some 
measures may defeat others, possibly better ones e.g. risk insurance subsidies may 
disincentive or postpone adaptation and technological changes, or food stockpiles could 
displace private and more efficient schemes. Still other measures are only available for large-
scale investments, and to Finance Ministers with deep pockets. Finally, but most importantly 
for this enquiry, measures taken in one country may negatively affect climate resilience in 
another country. 
Hence, for the purpose of our analysis, we list potentially available measures, not for their 
established or claimed climate-smartness but under a trade and investment focus. The seven 
categories in the below 'Climate Change Tool Box' for Agriculture have been chosen based 
on the author’s recent research and in an increasing order of their potential trade effects i.e. 
in view of their potential relevance under WTO Law. They claim neither completeness nor 
actual trade impacts or trade rule issues. They only signal the types of policy measures 
which regulators may consider as making a substantial contribution to climate change 
mitigation or adaptation. 
Box 1: Potentially climate-smart agricultural policy measures under a trade and 
investment focus 
Research, Education 
and Extension (without 
a direct impact on 
exports) 
Basic scientific research, policy advice, training and extension services 
Legal issues (with or 
without a trade impact) 
Land tenure, women’s rights, indigenous peoples’ and communal 
rights, cooperatives reform, intellectual property rights along the food 
value chain, technology transfer provisions, cartels vs competition, 
other restrictions protecting local food value chains, access to courts 
and enforcement, legal assistance 
Social policies 
(regardless of the source 
of finance) 
(Small) farmer support schemes (including for fishermen, forest 
dwellers, nomads and other vulnerable groups), gender measures, 
food aid and school food schemes, emergency measures, migration 
policies 
Production (with or 
without impact on 
exports or on import 
displacement) 
Subsidies (investment and consumption incentives, exceptions for 
sensitive sectors), (staple) food support (infrastructure, operation), 
food safety improvements along the food chain, (subsidised) 
production risk insurance schemes, various forms of food stockpile 
policies, access to credits, meteorology tools, (agricultural) biofuels, 
biotech (GMO), organic agriculture, fuelwood, sequestration and local 
photovoltaic schemes 
Commerce (with or 
without production and 
trade impact) 
Commodity exchanges, weather (re-)insurance, (international) futures 
and other risk hedging instruments, regional, private and ‘virtual’ food 
reserve schemes, consumer information e.g. labelling 
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Investment (whether 
national or international, 
or a combination of 
both) 
Impact assessments (ex ante / ex post) of bilateral and regional 
investment protection agreements and other instruments, investment 
and production credits, FDI incentives and investment contracts, ISDS 
Trade Tariffs, quotas (tariff-rate quotas or quantitative import restrictions), 
licensing, other border measures with a goods and services footprint 
differentiation component (BAM, ETS, differential CO2 taxes, 
performance requirements), safeguards (including climate-related 
exceptions e.g. prudential carve-outs for financial services), export 
taxes and restrictions, trade defence and balance of payments 
measures, infant industry protection, import standards and 
regulations, trade promotion; NTM (such as technical standards, 
conformity assessment procedures, local content requirements, 
various restrictions on climate-oriented services trade) 
Source: Häberli (2016 and 2017a) 
According to FAO research, at the time of writing this article very few NDC indicated the type 
of measures with a possible trade or (foreign) investment impact (Brenda and Zimmermann 
2018). The preliminary legal analysis of some such measures in Section 4 will look at 
potential conflicts with trade rules of (1) climate measures taken at the border, (2) footprint 
taxes, (3) mitigation and adaptation incentives, (4) labels, and (5) risk management 
measures. Before that, Section 3 looks at the possibly relevant trade rules and case law. 
3. WTO Rules and Case Law Relevant for Climate Action 
The relevant rules and commitments agreed by the WTO membership enshrine non-
discrimination as their basic principle. This section starts by explaining where this principle 
can help to reinforce climate action – and where it might hamper it (1). Some specific WTO 
rules for agriculture show similar issues (2). This leads to the question whether the available 
exceptions allow for climate action (3), and how the Paris Agreement and the WTO try to 
address legitimate development concerns, within the overarching respective commitments to 
reduce greenhouse gases and unjustified obstacles to trade (4). Finally, even though 
Regional Trade Agreements do not contain numerous substantive disciplines and policy 
constraints in respect of agriculture-related climate-smart policies, a look at their procedural 
components shows a potentially powerful incentive for trading partners to adopt such 
policies without trade distortions (5). 
1 Basic WTO Non-Discrimination Trade Rules 
According to the preamble of the WTO Agreement, the main objective of the World Trade 
Organization is ‚raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand‘ basically by ‚reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.‘15 
Like for the Paris Agreement, the attainment of these objectives has been qualified in 1995 
by a number of sustainable development considerations: “allowing for the optimal use of the 
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
15 UNTS, vols. 1867, 1868 and 1869, No. 1-31874, and annex A in vols. 1890 and 1895 (emphasis 
added) 
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to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development.” 
According to the WTO Appellate Body this preamble text ‚gives colour, texture and shading 
to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement.‘16 It seems to offer a 
large discretion to the WTO membership in determining their own environmental objectives, 
policies and regulations (including their trade impact). Nonetheless – and here is the red 
line! – ‚that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the 
General Agreement and the other covered agreements.‘17 
The most important WTO requirement can be described very simply as a prohibition of 
discrimination. The purpose is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal measures 
to imports. This means non-discrimination (a) between products and services of different 
foreign origins (MFN – Art. I GATT) and (b) between products and services of foreign and 
domestic origin (NT – Art. III GATT). WTO Law aims at preventing trade distortions and 
promoting competitive conditions between imported and domestic products. It does not ask 
for the objectives of, say, a climate-smart measure. But, since 2015, it prohibits all export 
subsidies i.e. even measures which might make sense under a mitigation perspective, such 
as export subsidies for low-footprint foodstuffs. Incidentally, WTO rules do not prevent self-
discrimination, such as taxing GHG emissions arising from domestic food production only. 
The main problem for climate-smart policies is the prohibition of discrimination between 
otherwise ‘like’ products differing in respect of their carbon footprint resulting from different 
production and processing methods (PPM). For instance, a BAM on imported commodities 
produced with a high GHG output cannot exceed taxes applied to ‚the like domestic product 
or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or 
produced in whole or in part‘ (Art. II:2(a) GATT).18 The essential question which will have to 
be answered on a case-by-case basis is whether the imported product is really a ‘like’ 
product, and whether it is accorded ‘less favourable’ treatment than that accorded to like 
domestic products.19 The likeness test generally applied under WTO Case Law comprises 
four categories of ‘characteristics’ that the products involved might share: ‚(i) the physical 
16 AB Report, US — Shrimp, paras. 152, 153 and 155 
17 AB Report, US — Gasoline, Findings and Conclusions (p. 28), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/2ABR.WPF  
18 The obligation of non-discrimination in respect of ‘like’ products (once they have been cleared 
through customs) is also formulated in Article III:2. GATT-Article III:4 also encompasses the 
obligation of non-discrimination in respect of all internal regulations, regardless of their purpose 
(emphasis added): 
‚The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall 
not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively 
on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.‘ 
19 The Appellate Body cited the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, 
para. 18. The same test was used in Appellate Body Report, Canada — Periodicals, pp. 21–22, and in 
many other cases. It is also worth noting that ‚likeness‘ has been defined in the same way under 
Articles II:2 and III:4 GATT (cf. Appellate Body Report, Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 
116). 
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properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the 
same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products 
as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want 
or demand; and (iv) the international classification of the products for tariff purposes.‘ In the 
same case the Appellate Body also made it clear that a panel needed ‚to examine, in each 
case, all of the pertinent evidence.‘20 
Clara Brandi has noted a particular difficulty for the legal assessment of the so-called ‘non-
product related PPMs’ (npr-PPM) which leave no trace in the final product. She rightly points 
out that the multilateral trading system does not make a clear distinction between products 
solely based on their levels of embedded carbon.21 Whether such products can be considered 
‚unlike‘ has never been settled in a WTO legal dispute. 
Actually, it could even be argued that certain incentives offered to climate-friendly product 
imports are a form of discrimination against ‚like‘ products with a lesser mitigation impact. In 
a case with automobile subsidies and local content requirements (TRIMS), the Panel held 
that ‚a condition which must be met in order to obtain an advantage consisting of the right 
to import certain products duty-free‘ can be subject to the NT obligation in GATT-Article 
III:4, even if compliance is not mandatory.22 
As to the other condition for a violation of the non-discrimination obligation, the ‚less 
favourable treatment‘, the way a climate standard is applied to imports and to local 
producers may come under WTO scrutiny. In a case dealing with gasoline quality 
requirements the Panel ascertained that ‚the measure in question afforded to imported 
products less favourable treatment than that afforded to domestic products because sellers 
of domestic gasoline were authorized to use an individual baseline, while sellers of 
(chemically identical) imported gasoline had to use the more onerous statutory baseline.‘23 
What matters here is, again, effective equality of competitive opportunities. 
2 Specific Rules for Agricultural Trade possibly applying to Climate Measures 
The main provisions for trade in agricultural products are found in the WTO Agreements on 
Agriculture (AoA) and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Basically, rules and 
limits apply to four categories of protection and support policies. 
1) Border protection is strictly limited to tariffs.24 The maximum rates 
('bound'/'scheduled') cannot be increased without compensation (GATT-Article 
XXVIII). Import quotas are prohibited under Article XI GATT. Rapidly increasing 
import volumes or price decreases may legitimise a ‘safeguard’ action by countries 
having had to transform their NTB into tariffs. An additional but time-limited border 
20 Appellate Body Report, EC — Asbestos, paras. 100–103 
21 Brandi (2017), p.4, also referring to differing scholarly interpretations by Low, Marceau and Reinaud 
2011, Grubb et al. 2015, Bacchus 2016 and Hawkins 2016. 
22 Panel Report, Canada — Autos, para. 10.73 
23 Panel Report, US — Gasoline, para. 6.10 (parenthesis added) 
24 Footnote 1 to AoA-Article 4.2 provides that ‘any measures of the kind which have been required to 
be converted into ordinary customary duties’ include ‘quantitative import restrictions, variable import 
levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through 
state-trading enterprises.’ 
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protection is available against imports threatening or jeopardising local production 
(GATT-Article XIX). But ‘climate safeguards’ at the border do not exist. 
2) Domestic support is either trade-distorting or not and, consequentially, limited or not. 
Except as outlined for category 4 below, there is no outright prohibition of 
agricultural product subsidies, but because they are considered to distort trade, they 
are limited for each and every WTO Member. The trigger and the conditions for 
unlimited governmental programmes are narrowly defined in the so-called Green Box 
(Annex 2 AoA). Eligible programmes which are possibly climate change-relevant 
include natural disaster relief, domestic food aid, food security stockpiles and income 
insurance, and other income safety nets discussed in Section 4.5 below. Yet, many 
developing countries now find themselves both without the financial means, and with 
little leeway under their Amber Box limits, to finance climate adaptation with 
programme support. True, there is a ‘Developing Country Green Box’ (AoA-Article 
6.2) which allows, say, certain credit schemes and subsidies e.g. for irrigation 
construction, and even running costs of low-income and resource-poor producers.25 
However, the small print in this rather contorted text seems to offer little scope for 
specific climate measures - even though it did not prevent rapidly increasing 
notifications by many developing countries, including clearly product-specific 
programmes in large surplus producers like India, or in oil producing countries like 
Oman. In the absence of case law, it is unclear whether the alleged general 
development and poverty concerns would pass the test of WTO-compatibility for such 
measures. Given that, according to Smith et al (IPPC 2014), more than 90% of GHG 
emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) come from 
developing countries, a very careful review of the exact use of Article 6.2 by some of 
the largest developing countries seems to be important. So far, climate adaptation 
has not yet been mentioned as a motive for Article 6.2 policies. 
3) Export subsidies, a long-term concern of many competitive agricultural product 
exporters, were finally prohibited in December 2015, at the 10th Ministerial 
Conference in Nairobi. But the rules tightening mandated under the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) never reached consensus. Nonetheless, other potentially 
climate-relevant export competition instruments, namely export credits, international 
food aid, and state-owned export companies can be examined under the recourse to 
anti-circumvention provisions of AoA-Article 10 and, for state trading, GATT-Article 
XVII. Relevant case law (briefly described in Section 4) indicates limits for certain 
climate adaptation tools even of a temporary nature. 
4) In line with AoA-Article 13, the WTO Subsidies Agreement (SCM) now also applies 
to agricultural export (and import displacement) measures. For climate mitigation 
purposes the strict disciplines under the SCM may become a problem. It is agreed 
that the origin of, say, methane is irrelevant for its impact on global warming. Hence, 
at least a time-limited subsidy to reduce agricultural GHG emissions in the EU or in 
the USA might actually have a beneficial impact; it could even be more effective than 
25 Article 6.2 provides in relevant parts that measures which are “an integral part of the development 
programmes of developing countries” […] “shall be exempt from domestic support reduction 
commitments that would otherwise be applicable to such measures”. These are “investment subsidies 
which are generally available to agriculture in developing country Members and agricultural input 
subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing country 
Members” (italics added). 
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financing mitigation efforts by, say, all Sub-Saharan farmers. Nonetheless, the said 
incentive might fall foul of the SCM prohibition applying to subsidies that are 
specifically provided to an enterprise or industry or a group of enterprises or 
industries. On the other side, if farm subsidies claiming climate adaptation without 
actually doing so are to be avoided, any loosening of WTO disciplines might serve as 
a pretext for farmers to displace foreign competitors. 
Incidentally, developed countries may also find problems in regulating imports in the wake of 
a disaster. The European Union used to issue so-called ‚hurricane licences‘ allowing EU 
producers, after a tropical storm, to import bananas from other countries. The original Panel 
had found that (exclusively) “producer organizations or operators can expect, in the event of 
a hurricane, to be compensated for their losses in the form of ‘quota rents’ generated by 
hurricane licences.” The AB agreed, and noted that this practice affected the competitive 
conditions in the market in favour of bananas with EU origin, adding as its constant red line 
“[w]e do not dispute the right of WTO Members to mitigate or remedy the consequences of 
natural disasters. However, Members should do so in a manner consistent with their 
obligations under the GATT 1994 and the other covered agreements.”26 
Clearly, climate change hits the screens of agricultural policymakers at a time of unfinished 
WTO business. The playing field, put simply, is not even. This can have serious 
consequences for food exporting and importing countries without substantial border 
protection, major subsidy allowances, or the remaining export promotion instruments. The 
main reason for this systemic weakness in WTO rules is the failure of the Doha Round 
negotiations, stalled since 2008, to pursue the ‘reform process’ under Article 20 AoA, and to 
agree on additional disciplines making trade patterns more sustainable, and more resilient 
under a climate change perspective. 
3 Exceptions, Interpretations, Amendments and Waivers 
As explained in Section 1 above, all national measures can be challenged by any concerned 
WTO Member and at any time. This right to complain, of course, is without prejudice to the 
ruling reached in a dispute. However, measures found not to be in conformity with the 
agreed WTO rules and market access commitments face the possibility of being reversed or 
otherwise sanctioned. 
There is no rule without exceptions. Environmental protection qualifies in principle, if not in 
practice, as a legitimate exception for an otherwise WTO-incompatible measure under Article 
XX GATT. There are other exceptions as well. In this section we only look at the most 
relevant exceptions for environmental protection in general, inasmuch they might be found 
relevant for climate measures. As in the whole article we refrain from reaching conclusions 
as to the applicability of such exceptions, and on the WTO-compatibility of any specific 
measure. 
The general exceptions in GATT-Article XX allow Members to take all necessary measures, 
for instance ‚to protect public morals‘ (lit. a); ‚to protect human, animal or plant life or health‘ 
(lit. b); ‚relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption‘ (lit. 
26 AB Report, EC — Bananas III, para. 213 
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g). The somewhat antique language in lit. g dates back to 1947; but it has been clarified in a 
range of adjudicator decisions that, for instance, ‚natural resources‘ include endangered 
species such as sea turtles.27 
Case law shows that many defences invoking Article XX exceptions were found not to justify 
a rules violation. The interesting question here would then be whether a Panel or the 
Appellate Body may theoretically find an incriminated climate-related measure to be 
legitimately based on binding public international law. The possibility of environmental treaty 
law prevailing under trade law is expressly foreseen under the Vienna Convention (VCLT), 
and has been recognised by the Appellate Body. Such a finding would then uphold the 
incriminated measure, and prevent retaliation by the complainant. However, so far no WTO 
ruling has ever recognised the mandatory nature of an environmental treaty in a specific 
case, or of a generally applicable international environmental standard. 
The Appellate Body has repeatedly enjoined panels to allow both for a maximum policy 
space and to respect public international law such as environmental norms and human 
rights. In particular, panels are tasked with a ‚holistic’ treaty interpretation pursuant to the 
customary rules as provided for in VCLT-Articles 31 and 32.28 At the same time, panels as 
well as the AB itself do not and cannot make any new rules (Art. 3.1 DSU). They must look 
at the various exceptions foreseen in the WTO agreements, and invoked by the respondents. 
But they also have to respect the so-called ‚chapeau‘ of Article XX providing that all 
exceptions remain subject ‚to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.‘ 
(emphasis added) This again is the red line where so far virtually all measures claiming 
Article XX exceptions as a legal base have failed the test of non-discrimination. For instance, 
the EU tried to justify its seals product import ban with its (self-defined) ‚public morals’ (Art. 
XX lit.a GATT), arguing that its import ban of seals products responded to public concerns 
about killing seals and their babies. In order to justify a marketing prohibition exception for 
seals hunted by Inuit of EU origin, it also invoked international standards outside WTO Law, 
adhered to by all the parties in that dispute, and laid down in various ILO Conventions,29 the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples30 and OIE Guiding Principles on Animal 
Welfare included in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Code in 2004. Both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body accepted the admissibility in principle of ‘public morals’ as a justification for 
trade discrimination. Nevertheless, they agreed with the complainants that the EU had not 
established that its seals regime had no less trade-restrictive alternative to a partial and 
discriminatory ban; they also found that the invoked international standards did not compel 
the EU to proscribe imports.31 
27 AB Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Product, para 131 
28 Cf. AB Report US – Continued Zeroing, para 268; AB Report EC – Chicken Cuts, para 176. 
29 ILO Convention 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989) 
30 Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/61/53), part 
one, chap. II, sect. A 
31 The complainants had argued that „the international agreements cited by the European Union 
before the Panel do not require the European Union to protect the interests of Inuit or other 
indigenous communities by discriminating against the products of non-indigenous peoples.“ AB Report 
EC – Seals, para 2.4. 
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Whether environmental treaty law will ever justify a trade rule violation in a WTO dispute 
remains an open question. As already pointed out, no WTO ruling has ever acknowledged 
the existence of a conflict between WTO and other international treaty rules, which would 
then have called for a decision on whether a general principle of law prevailed over WTO 
Law. The AB, never shy of admonishing panels to take international treaty law into account, 
forgot to even mention the VCLT in its final ruling in the seals case. Only one (unappealed) 
panel decision ruled that « the principle of precaution is a ‘general principle of international 
law’ » and could thus could be « considered a ‘rule of international law’ within the meaning 
of Article 31(3)(c) » (VCLT).32 
There are further exceptions for all these rules. But it is far from being established that, say, 
mandatory cost internalisation of GHG emissions under a polluter-pays-principle would be 
found WTO-compatible if it was applied not only to domestic producers but also to imports. 
This being, so far no agricultural policy measure has had to pass such a test – simply 
because very few appear to have been taken; very few can be detected in the NDC, and 
none have been notified to WTO or reported in trade policy reviews. 
Window 1: The Story of the EU’s ETS Extension to Aviation  
32 Panel Report EC – Biotech, para 7.67 (emphasis added). Isabelle Van Damme (2009, p. 369) noted 
that this Panel had recognised that treaties and general principles of law could constitute ‘rules of 
international law’ thereby rejecting a defence brought by the United States when it ruled that it did 
have the discretion to consider such rules as ‘context’ in order to determine the ‘ordinary meaning’ 
under Article 31.1 VCLT. 
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The WTO rulings for renewable energy measures are another sobering lesson for ‚mutual 
supportiveness’ advocates. Only one fossil fuel case was ever settled in a formal dispute.33 In 
that case the AB finding that the air contamination standards applied to domestic vs foreign 
gasoline did not meet the ‘less trade restrictive’ condition of the chapeau of Art XX; in that 
case, raising the domestic standard would have solved the WTO problem – and reduced air 
pollution.34 But all of over a dozen disputes (cf. Box 2) on water, solar and wind energy 
ended with the respondents failing to convince WTO adjudicators that the incriminated 
measures did not afford additional protection to their domestic interests (NT) or discriminate 
between different foreign suppliers (MFN).35 To the extent that a final ruling had been made 
public by the time of writing this article, all respondents had to withdraw or to adjust their 
incriminated measures. Without putting in doubt the legal justification of these rulings, this is 
33 The ruling in another fossil fuel case was still pending at the time of writing: DS476 EC – Energy 
package which directly challenges EU subsidising programs on gas. According to the WTO website, 
the panel report is about to be published. 
34 US – Gasoline (DS 2 and DS 4). This classic WTO case already referred to in FN15 above is about a 
regulation by the United States' Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act of 1990, set 
up to control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in or 
imported into the United States. The AB reversed the Panel and found that the regulation did fall 
within the terms of GATT-Article XX(g). It nonetheless concluded that the so-called baseline 
establishment rules in the US regulation ‘fail to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of 
the General Agreement, and accordingly are not justified under Article XX of the General Agreement.’ 
(Appellate Body Report US – Gasoline, dated 29 April 1996, p.28 lit.a and c – italics in the original) 
35 De Bièvre, Espa and Poletti (2017) have tried to explain the quasi-absence of fossil fuel cases and 
the “skewed distribution of energy subsidies dispute settlement complaints at the WTO.” They 
correctly noted that, rather than addressing the general harmfulness of all energy subsidies under the 
ASCM, most of these cases focus on renewable project incentives subject to local content 
requirements. 
The EU Aviation Directive is a case in point where several countries, including China, 
Malaysia and the USA, argued that this measure violated WTO non-discrimination rules, 
even though according to the Annex on Air Transport Services such s rvices are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of the GATS. Accordingly, they threatened with retaliation if the EU 
should go ahead regardless with its Directive introduced in 2012. The issue – and the 
fundamental question whether the EU's aviation scheme could be justified (here under 
Article XIV of the GATS) – was never addressed in a WTO dispute.  Subsequently, the EU 
had to suspend this climate-friendly measure by which all airlines, regardless of their origin, 
would have had to acquire and ‘surrender’ to the EU allowances for the CO2 emissions 
produced by their aircrafts. Bartels (2012) shows that border carbon adjustments varying 
with transport distances might not withstand a WTO legal challenge. He also demonstrated 
that the EU’s scheme violated its international civil aviation obligations, after it had failed to 
obtain an international agreement on an aviation ETS within the framework of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
A carbon scheme that is administratively feasible and WTO-compatible remains to be found. 
Meltzer (2012) pointed out, while recognising the imperative need for action to address 
climate change, that it will be crucial to manage the trade and climate change intersection 
in ways that maintain the integrity of the WTO system. He argued that the WTO rules which 
the EU Aviation Directive might have violated are actually useful disciplines guiding 
countries in the development and application of climate action, without impeding 
international trade. Hence, the basic challenge in his view is to find an appropriate balance 
between policy space of WTO Members for CO2 reduction measures, while maintaining an 
open and non-discriminatory trading system that supports economic growth and global 
welfare. 
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perhaps an indication that future agricultural cases might well come to the same impasse 
under a climate change mitigation perspective, i.e. blocking the way for a number of 
otherwise climate-smart policies. 
Box 2: Renewable Energy Measures under the WTO Fire 
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Case 
Number 
Respondent and (Short) Title Complainant Current Status 
DS 419 China — Measures concerning 
wind power equipment 
United States In consultations since 22 
December 2010 
DS 412 Canada — Renewable Energy Japan Implementation notified by 
respondent on 5 June 2014 
DS 426 Canada — Feed-In Tariff Program European  
Union 
Implementation notified by 
respondent on 5 June 2014 
DS 421 Moldova — Environmental Charge Ukraine Panel established, but not 
yet composed on 17 June 
2011 
DS 437 US — Countervailing Measures 
(China)36 
China Report(s) adopted on 16 
January 2015, with a 
recommendation to bring 
measure(s) into conformity 
DS 443 European Union and a Member 
State37 — Certain Measures 
Concerning the Importation of 
Biodiesels 
Argentina In consultations since 17 
August 2012 
DS 449 US — Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Measures (China) 
China Report(s) adopted, with 
recommendation to bring 
measure(s) into conformity 
on 22 July 2014 
DS 459 European Union and Certain 
Member States — Certain 
Measures on the Importation and 
Marketing of Biodiesel and 
Measures Supporting the 
Biodiesel Industry 
Argentina In consultations since 15 
May 2013 
DS 473 European Union — Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Biodiesel from 
Argentina 
Argentina Panel report under appeal 
on 20 May 2016 
DS 452 European Union and certain 
Member States — Certain 
Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector 
China In consultations since 5 
November 2012 
DS 480 EU — Biodiesel Indonesia Panel composed on 4 
November 2015 
DS 456 India — Solar Cells United States Panel report dated 20 April 
2016 under appeal  
DS 510 US — Renewable Energy India Panel established, but not 
yet composed on 21 March 
2017 
Source: WTO Webpage (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm) 
verified as of 4 September 2017 
36 Including subsidies for solar panels and wind towers 
37 Spain 
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As matters stand today we are forced to conclude that the emerging WTO case law possibly 
relevant for climate change-related measures basically maintains all fundamental non-
discrimination principles. The complex interfaces between environmental and trade standards 
remain an understudied and apparently non-negotiable topic. At any rate, no environmental 
treaties and standards have been accepted as justifying violations of a WTO rule. Things 
might yet change without a rules amendment.38 However, the present situation is hardly an 
invitation for regulators to adopt climate measures without a reasonable assurance of legal 
security. 
It is often said that legal security for regulators and operators can be obtained in only two 
ways: negotiate – or litigate. This new issue of climate action without trade friction requires 
swift action. Nonetheless, negotiation without an interdisciplinary issues assessment is bound 
to fail. And litigation must come second, in order « to clarify the existing provisions » (Art. 
3.2 DSU). 
For instance, the legal insecurity for all Article XX type of exceptions leads to the question 
whether the implementation of the Paris Agreement requires WTO to consider rules 
amendments which do not impair trade security. Common law practitioners tend to consider 
AB findings as Case Law with capital letters, and as a final interpretation of the specific WTO 
rule at issue. However, each and every AB/DSB ruling only applies to the case at hand. 
Litigating parties, and adjudicators, can always argue in another case that a different 
interpretation is more appropriate. Before we look at Amendments and Waivers it should be 
pointed out that the authority to issue a legally binding interpretation rests solely with the 
highest WTO body, the General Council (Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement) – as opposed to 
an interpretation in dispute settlement, subject to DSU-Article 3.2.39 So far, no such legal 
interpretation has been adopted by the General Council. 
Notwithstanding the rather dogmatic judiciary, and the ‚splendid isolation‘ of the multilateral 
trading system, it should be noted that all WTO provisions can be the object of 
amendments. Here too, only the General Council can take such a decision, with a majority 
of at least three fourths of the membership (Art. X of the WTO Agreement). The only 
precedent is the ‘affordable drugs’ amendment of the TRIP Agreement. This was the first 
ever amendment of a WTO rule, without relevance for climate policies.40 
The same procedure applies to waivers in favour of a particular Member or group of 
Members allowing them not to comply with specific rules and obligations. Waivers are more 
frequent and somewhat easier to obtain than amendments, but they have time limits, and 
each extension has to be justified.41 One specific example at the juncture between Trade 
38 To take a perhaps not too remote example, an indirect government preference for domestic 
competitors threatened by, say, rising sea levels, might perhaps find acceptance in a WTO dispute as 
a Paris-related measure, even though it could de facto discriminate foreign suppliers and products. 
39 According to DSU-Article 3.2 the rulings and recommendations of the DSB serve only ‘to clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements’ and ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.’ 
40 The General Council Decision of 6 December 2005 (WT/L/641 dated 8 December 2005) 
‘Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement’ entered into force on 23 January 2017, replacing a 2003 waiver 
for members who since then have accepted the amendment. 
41 Cf. Article IX of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (the ‘WTO 
Agreement’); the Guiding Principles to be followed in considering applications for waivers adopted on 
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and Human Rights – the only one involving ‚non-product-related PPM‘ – might show a way 
forward. The ‚Kimberley Waiver’ was adopted in 2006, allowing importers to deny MFN 
market access rights to so-called blood diamonds (the revenue from diamond sales financed 
authoritarian regimes, oppression and conflict).42 Again, whether a proposal by a number of 
parties to the Paris Agreement to the WTO General Council for a (presumably much more 
general) amendment or a waiver would be acceptable to the trading constituents is an open 
question. The threshold, at any rate, would be high; nowadays, wide-ranging waivers are 
few and far between. 
The underlying principle is that – just like the Paris Agreement – the WTO’s DSB cannot rule 
on the policies or their objectives, only on a specific measure taken by one of its members. 
Neither can it prescribe ‘good governance’ or ‘good policies.’ Put simply, its only role is to 
protect its membership against protectionism. Also, the WTO litigation procedure is 
‘automatic’ in the sense that when a complainant considers that its WTO rights are infringed 
by another member, it can and will obtain the establishment of a dispute settlement panel. 
Such a panel is then bound to report its findings to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which 
in turn will ‘automatically’ endorse these findings (except by a never-happened consensual 
rejection). Both parties can appeal these findings. Ultimately the AB is, like the panels, 
bound to submit to the DSB its findings on the compliance of the revised measures with the 
WTO obligations of the respondent. A non-compliance ruling adopted by the DSB allows the 
complainant to eventually demand enforcement through the ‚arbitrator‘, usually the original 
Panel, if need be by recourse to the so-called retaliation procedure involving an authorisation 
to ‘withdraw concessions.’ At this stage, the arbitrator would determine the maximum 
retaliation amount; the AB and the DSB cannot review or correct that amount. The 
complainant is then free to apply punitive tariffs above the MFN level against imports from 
the respondent. 
The only scenario by which this ‚automatic’ settlement of disputes might look beyond WTO 
would be if a panel or the AB, based on the VCLT, find in a specific case that international 
treaty law supersedes WTO trade law. At any rate, in view of the above-mentioned case law, 
and the at least initially extremely large leeway afforded by the Paris agreement, climate 
change mitigation measures are unlikely candidates for a WTO revolution, even under the 
most activist WTO judges. 
What can then be said at this stage except that, at a very general level, WTO Law and 
practice appear as a self-contained bulwark against discrimination – including discrimination 
inherent in climate-smart measures with a collateral negative trade impact? On the other 
side, while the diplomatic presumption of ‚mutual supportiveness’ turns out to be a poor 
guide for NDC formulation, it is equally impossible to conclude that no exception, 
amendment or waiver can cure the discriminatory implications of footprint differentiations. 
1 November 1956 (BISD 5S/25); the Understanding in Respect to Waivers of Obligations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; and Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and 
XII of the WTO Agreement agreed by the General Council (WT/L/93). 
42 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds. General Council Waiver Decision of 15 
December 2006, WTO Document WT/L/676 dated 19 December 2006. The waiver has been extended 
until 31 December 2018 by a decision of the General Council dated 11 December 2012 (WTO 
Document WT/L/876 dated 14 December 2012). 
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In our preliminary legal analysis in Section 3 we look at some of the emerging patterns for 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement in the light of relevant WTO provisions. Again, 
this is not a legal opinion, but an initial discussion of different instances where climate 
measures or specific NDC might face WTO challenges under one of the WTO provisions listed 
in Box 5. 
Before looking at the already available NDC, however, it is perhaps useful to briefly look at 
another difference between the WTO and the Paris Convention, namely the way each of 
these treaties deals with the development differences between their constituents. 
4 Adressing Development Concerns 
Under the Paris Agreement, the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
(CBDR) is an obligation for all parties when formulating their NDC. The above-quoted 
wording in Article 2.2 is the result of protracted negotiations about the role and impact of 
historic and present, and of relative and absolute GHG producers. 
As said before, ‚Paris’ has no specific obligations on how to take the CBDR principle into 
account. Not surprisingly, most developing countries pledge to contribute to the goal of not 
exceeding global warming by more than 20C, but they subject a part of their measures to the 
availability of funds. On their side, developed countries commit to not only reduce their 
footprint but – depending on domestic policy considerations and debates – to also finance 
climate programmes in poor countries in order to limit global warming to 1.50C. Some of 
them do so by claiming ETS/IET credits; but all of them acknowledge the CBDR principle.43 
In the WTO, like for its predecessor the GATT, the development concerns of the membership 
are reflected in a quite different way. Each and every WTO Agreement acknowledges the 
development dimension, up to and including the most recent Trade Faciliation Agreement 
which foresees specific measures supporting developing country efforts to make trade flow 
more freely (TFA). Beyond the preambular language, the classic precept of reciprocal and 
multilateral concessions is toned down with numerous preferences from which only 
developing countries, or only least developing countries (LDC) will benefit. This means in 
WTO speak that ‚Special and Differentiated Treatment’ (SDT) is offered to (self-designated) 
developing countries and to LDC (i) for their rights in terms of exceptions, flexibilities, and 
differentiated rules, and (ii) for obligations relative to notification formats and deadlines, 
transparency, and other procedural and institutional provisions. The official list of SDT 
provisions presented at the Doha Ministerial in 2001 has 130 pages – but it appears to offer 
no help for the differentiation commitment under the Paris Agreement.44 Especially large 
developing countries may not only find financial assistance hard to come by. More to the 
point here, trade rule exceptions such as ‘infant industry’ protection are likely to be very 
difficult to pass the test without a complaint. As shown in recent WTO Ministerial Conference 
43 Brazil, for its part, refused in its INDC the automatic use of market mechanisms (e.g. international 
ETS) that may be established under the Paris agreement; but this is not an issue under consideration 
in this article. 
44 WTO, Committee on Trade and Development, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions. Note by Secretariat dated 21 September 2001 
(WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1) 
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issues (public stockholdings, or fisheries) the same goes for amendments and waivers (or 
pledges of non-litigation). 
More importantly still, ‚SDT’ offers no avenues for measures addressing climate-related 
concerns of smallholders, women, nomads, or small fishermen as mentioned in the Paris 
Agreement. Obviously, such measures are difficult to design without the WTO having to look 
into domestic affairs. Any effort to accommodate such concerns in the WTO would have to 
avoid opening the door to all kinds of freeways whereby the gains of progressive and mutual 
trade liberalisation could again be squandered without a corresponding climate-friendly gain 
for all. Nevertheless, the challenge for any meaningful climate-smart SDT is to design 
support programmes without negatively impacting on market access rights and interests of 
third (developing) countries. 
5 Climate Provisions in Regional Agreements 
Before closing this general overview of multilateral trade rules a word is indicated on regional 
trade agreements (also called preferential, or free trade, or economic partnership 
agreements). 
Generally speaking the new generation of RTA, especially ‚North-South‘ treaties, emphasises 
the importance of sustainable development also in a trade and investment context; some 
make a special mention of climate change. However, none appears to have substantive 
‚WTO Plus’ provisions relevant for climate mitigation measures, none has ever put any limits 
on domestic agricultural support, and (so far) none of them refers to the still newer Paris 
Agreement. 
This does not mean that Regional Agreements cannot show a way forward for the dichotomy 
between trade and environment rules and societal concerns. Recent agreements typically 
contain exhortatory language over and above the hitherto usual preambular texts.45 Whether 
a 'TPP11' will address climate change - as the originally signed text did - remains to be seen. 
Some RTA have extensive dispute settlement procedures possibly involving private operators 
and sometimes even civil society organisations, and all refer to relevant WTO disciplines. 
Most importantly for this article, the agreements concluded by the USA and the EU innovate 
in their procedural and institutional set-up provisions. The Joint Committees e.g. on 
Environment and Trade offer a pre-litigation avenue for a discussion between the trading 
partners. These institutional mechanisms can be said to at least match the corresponding 
WTO fora which often are exclusively staffed by trade diplomats. While actual sanctions are 
extremely rare, a ‚regional’ committee process can and does yield insights into the reasons 
for a government taking – or omitting – measures with a negative environmental impact. In 
addition, so-called cases of carbon leakage (‚eco-dumping’ and, similarly, ‚socio-dumping’) 
can eventually lead to a withdrawal of concessions not unlike under the WTO litigation 
procedures. The key to such sanctions is not the environmental degradation or a violation of 
45 For instance, the EU – Singapore FTA has some relevant rules on climate mitigation measures. 
Article 7.1 specifies that 'In line with global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Parties 
share the objective of promoting, developing and increasing the generation of energy from renewable 
sustainable non-fossil sources, particularly through facilitating trade and investment. To this effect, 
the Parties shall cooperate towards removing or reducing tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers and 
fostering regulatory convergence with or towards regional and international standards.' 
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basic workers’ rights, but the trade distortion caused, for instance, by illegal logging or child 
labour. 
Another reason underlining the importance of regional trade agreements is their more 
constraining review and deliberation process. 
For instance, the institutional set-up in the EU – Vietnam FTA published on 1 February 2016 
administers the commitments of the parties in respect of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (Art. 4) and of Climate Change (Art. 5, with a reference to UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol). In case of a disagreement, the standard trade dispute settlement 
procedures (arbitration panel and mediation) do not apply. But Articles 15-17 lay down the 
procedures for the Contact Points, the Specialised Committee on Trade and Sustainable 
Development, and for a Panel of Experts whose mandate is to look into divergences in 
respect of the treaty commitments.46 
A recent trade and climate-related example of unilateralism vs regionalism is the USA – Peru 
Trade Promotion Agreement. It also has sustainable development commitments including on 
environmental issues, and workers’ rights and trade in forestry products. Trade distortions 
can be pursued in litigation. Notwithstanding this possibility, on 19 October 2017 the United 
States chose to take a unilateral measure instead of initiating a formal trade dispute. After 
the treaty procedures providing for a joint examination of complaints failed to stop non-
certified tropical timber exports to the US, the USTR decided to block imports from a 
Peruvian trader allegedly engaged in illegal timber logging.47 Peru responded immediately by 
pledging renewed efforts to build a ‚robust forest system.‘48 
In the light of these elements, and given the remoteness of a climate-smart WTO, 
regionalism might appear, for the time being, as a slightly better, if still indirect, avenue to 
climate disciplines enforcement. Unilateral measures may fall foul of WTO doctrine protecting 
against discrimination, and insisting on internationally agreed standards. But a ‚North-South’ 
RTA might help enforcement of commitments under international environmental treaties, or 
ILO Conventions – thanks to the frequent power imbalance between parties.49 
In the WTO, even a serious discussion on environmental issues or workers’ rights has so far 
been prevented by its membership. When will the trading community be ready to discuss 
climate measures? 
4. A Preliminary Legal Analysis 
As already indicated, none of the presently available INDC and NDC provide sufficient details 
on the ways and means to implement the Paris Agreement. Perhaps tellingly, the NDC of 
developed countries are even less specific in this regard, whereas many developing countries 
46 The agreed text of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement as of January 2016 is available on 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 (downloaded on 20 October 2017). 
47 World Trade Online, published by Inside US Trade dated 20 October 2017. USTR Lighthizer, in 
announcing this decision, was quoted as saying „This unprecedented enforcement action 
demonstrates President Trump’s strong commitment to enforcing our trade agreements and ensuring 
that trade is fair to the American people.“ 
48 Ibid., dated 23 October 2017. 
49 For Peru, and the treatment of allegations of illegal logging and workers’ rights infringements under 
international treaty law, see Häberli (2017b). 
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have outlined their plans with more specificity. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is 
China’s INDC which describes a number of potentially climate-smart agricultural 
modernisation programmes. In poorer countries the declared intentions to comply with their 
Paris commitments are partly subject to the availability of sufficient funds – a right which 
might be compromised by the withdrawal of the US signature. Countries like India also insist 
that climate change mitigation cannot come at the expense of their development. 
Given the present lack of precision and enactment of concrete implementation measures 
with a potential trade impact, only a preliminary legal analysis under a WTO perspective will 
be possible here. Based on recent literature describing climate-related border measures and 
subsidies, our considerations in this section will look at a number of measures envisaged in 
the various NDC (Benda and Zimmermann/FAO 2018). We particularly look at five types of 
programmes, likely to have repercussions on trade and services and investment, namely 
climate-related agricultural border measures (1); taxes (2); subsidies (3); climate tools 
intended to shape producer and consumer behaviour with other means, such as Non-Tariff 
Measures (NTM) by way of consumer information labels (4); and some risk management and 
risk insurance instruments (5). 
1 Border Measures 
The Paris Agreement, without saying so, implies counteracting ‘like’ products and services 
with a higher footprint. Even the choice of energy producing such goods may be 
‘discriminated’ where countries move out of coal, if they then expect imports to have been 
produced in a comparable climate-friendly way. This of course can take place in a number of 
different ways, and not necessarily through discrimination of only foreign goods (MFN/NT). 
To be clear, Paris does not prescribe border adjustment measures (BAM). The specific 
situation in each country and region, and the rapid technology development in this field, 
prevent a general assumption on the necessity of BAM. For instance, whether a carbon tax 
yields a better result, for global food security, than carbon sequestration, depends on many 
different factors.50 Hence, the WTO would be ill-advised not to examine the possibility for a 
legal pathway including BAM. 
Political expediency in many countries will often demand compensation for climate 
adaptation efforts, and restrictions at the border corresponding to those at home. Without a 
clarification in respect of BAM, the climate-smart policy measures outlined in Box 1 might 
well have to forego both restrictions and prohibitions at home and at the border. The tool 
box would then be limited to ‘carrots’ such as R&D, technology transfer, ODA, and other 
clearly Green Box support. Whether countries can then meet their Paris commitments with 
carrots alone is an open question. Politically speaking, the sensitivity of agriculture makes 
self-discrimination extremely difficult, consisting in giving away ‚carrots‘ abroad without BAM. 
50 A recent study on carbon sequestration was provided by Frank et al (2017) showing that, in certain 
developing countries, increasing soil carbon sequestration on agricultural land would not only allow 
reducing the calorie loss implied, thereby limiting the impact on undernourishment to 20–75 million 
people. In addition, sequestration would store significant amounts of carbon in soils, and be more 
efficient in terms of food security, than a carbon tax. 
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Such a ‚circle of action paralysis‘ could also apply to ‘sticks’ at home involving production 
prohibitions, or the internalisation of carbon emissions costs e.g. through taxation. 
Perhaps tellingly, the FAO survey of INDC and NDC has shown no concrete examples of 
governments explicitly proposing to implement climate-related agricultural BAM in order to 
ensure equal treatment of imports and national production mitigation policies (Benda and 
Zimmermann/FAO 2018). Some intervention proposals are sufficiently broad and general to 
potentially include BAM. But even New Zealand – the only country known to have envisaged 
such a measure because of the high absolute GHG production of its agricultural industry – is 
now no longer officially contemplating such measures. The main reason for this ‚general 
inaction’ may lie in the fact that so far only mitigation and adaptation subsidies are being 
proposed or introduced. As pointed out above, another reason is the legal uncertainty of 
BAM under WTO trade rules. Unlike for renewable energies, there is no case law here. But as 
pointed out below, WTO compliance of border adjustment measures remains an open 
question, and the risk of failing to comply with general and/or specific rules is high. Holzer 
(2014) provides a good overview of different scholarly views and practice in this legal 
minefield, and a detailed analysis of merchandise trade implications of carbon-related BAM. 
This being, many NDC indicate a commitment to develop some sort of policy framework and 
institutional developments geared towards the mitigation of GHG emissions. China, for 
example, includes commitments to strengthen laws and regulations on climate change, and 
to implement their National Program on Climate Change and provincial climate programs. 
These are commitments that could include everything or nothing, but it is easy to see that a 
BAM could be part of broader efforts to shape the legal and regulatory sphere necessary to 
agree on an ambitious climate mitigation package. 
Very few more NDC specifics are available. One outstanding example is South Africa stating 
that policy instruments under development include regulatory standards and controls for 
specifically identified GHG pollutants and emitters. Given South Africa’s particularly strong 
exposure to climate change, this could be read as part of an ambitious mitigation 
programme requiring sacrifices at home, but also as a pointer towards BAM possibly 
conflicting with WTO rules. 
Actual border measures differing for identical imports save for a different footprint, or 
applying to goods with a higher footprint than that of ‘like’ domestic products have not yet 
been notified to the WTO. Here, the legal limits are clear: not only are tariffs in excess of the 
scheduled MFN rates prohibited. Several DSB rulings banned a number of measures such as 
variable import levies or discretionary licensing (which under Article 4.2 were to be ‘tariffied’ 
i.e. transformed into tariffs) – even when they did not breach the MFN level.51 
It should also be remembered that scheduled (i.e. bound) tariffs can be raised again, but 
only with adequate compensation offered to so-called ‘principal’ and ‘substantial suppliers’ of 
the goods involved (Art.XXVIII GATT). Other procedures apply to a modification of services 
commitments (Art.XXI GATS). Whether tariff increases (without differentiation) are 
conducive to better climate adaptation is another question. 
51 Chile — Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (DS 
207) 
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However, the most important impediment for BAM by way of tariffs or taxes differentiating 
according to footprints, or air transport distances, are the already mentioned national 
treatment provisions in Articles III:2 (prohibiting unjustified tariff differences) and III:4 GATT 
(allowing only legitimate regulatory distinctions). 
Solutions are definitely difficult to come by. Policymakers and operators willing to reduce 
GHG emissions at home are unlikely to accept what in their view amounts to ‘eco-dumped’ 
competing products. On the other hand, if a domestic subsidy were to not only reduce 
carbon footprint but, in addition, lower production costs and increase exports, a close look at 
how such climate measures are formulated and implemented would be necessary. A 'more 
than climate-necessary' subsidy element would have to be excluded from, say, a WTO rules 
amendment for purposes of Paris implementation of the type discussed in Section 3.3 above. 
Perhaps the same necessity requirement would have to be built into an economic 
assessment of antidumping measures or countervailing duties, and for the below discussed 
subsidies and other incentives (Section 4.3). Again, internationally agreed standards would 
provide an extremely useful threshold here. 
At this point, and in agreement with much of the recent literature, we have to conclude that 
BAM look like rather difficult propositions in the absence of agreed and mandatory 
international standards (Kang 2010, Holzer 2014). 
2 Tax My Footprint? 
Taxes on activities which are considered socially undesirable are sometimes called 'sin taxes'. 
Their intended effect is preventive (as opposed to taxes or fines for damages to society). 
Classic examples along the food chain are sumptuary taxes to mitigate the use of alcohol or 
tobacco. A fully successful soda tax on sugar-sweetened beverages was launched in 
Berkeley/California. Francis, Marron and Rueben (2016) describe the initial resistance to this 
scheme, its results compared with other Californian municipalities, and the very rapid spread 
of soda taxes worldwide. Political acceptance even in ‚tax-resilient’ legislatives turns out to 
be higher where tax revenues are reinvested in school-feeding and other public health 
programmes. This might also be the case for climate change mitigation for the transport 
sector, starting for instance with a tax on vehicles emitting excessive pollutants. On the 
other hand, public health policies so far unsuccessfully experimented with fat taxes 
(Denmark, United Kingdom). Cash-strapped Portugal envisages a salt tax for mid-2018. 
Here again, not a lot emerges explicitly from the NDC so far available. Taxation for climate 
change mitigation could be included under any broad commitment to reduce emissions or in 
the promotion of green technologies, which are abundant in the NDC analysed by FAO. But it 
is too early to see clearer indications on how governments intend to pursue such goals. 
Canada, for example, commits to taking strong action in the pursuit of a low-carbon 
economy, green infrastructure and clean technology. India sets the promotion of clean 
biomass energy as a goal. Fossil fuel subsidies in oil-producing countries are still as abundant 
as they are criticised by economists. Unsurprisingly, but only vaguely, Nigeria talks about 
reforming its petrol/diesel subsidies. While there are several ways through which these could 
be pursued, taxation of inputs and production practices with heavy footprints could 
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undoubtedly be one of them. Interestingly, Armenia proposes to create a climate change civil 
fund to be replenished by receipts stemming from environment fees including carbon taxing. 
Climate change mitigation-related taxes can have international repercussions. As shown 
above for the EU’s aviation ETS, this can easily raise opposition by affected countries, mainly 
because excise taxes applied based on the distance travelled by ‘like’ products could fall foul 
of Article III GATT. As for actual WTO case law, the rulings in US – Foreign Sales 
Corporation (DS 108) as well as for subsidies on large civil aircraft (DS 316, 317, 347 and 
353) confirmed that both direct and indirect taxes remain subject to multilateral trade rules 
in respect of subsidies, taxes, and BAM (Daly 2005). 
3 Subsidies 
In a ‚stick and carrot‘ view of regulatory action, subsidies are often an effective if not 
necessarily efficient climate action tool. Interestingly, not only developed countries use 
taxpayer contributions for various societal objectives and for farm income support purposes, 
some of which with a food security or even a climate mitigation component. Nowadays, 
many developing countries increasingly find the necessary resources for such purposes. As a 
result, especially so-called Amber Box support measures contribute to farm security in a way 
which other countries choose not to go, and which poor countries find impossible to compete 
with on world markets, and even at home. Coming to their defence, perhaps, are limitations 
established by case law referred above and below for tax breaks52 and for export 
competition instruments such as agricultural export credits.53 Similarly, export state trading 
practices of such as export and import restrictions made effective through state-trading 
operations of Marketing Boards must be guided by ‘commercial considerations’ (GATT-Article 
XVII).54 
The post-Paris NDC are a very first implementation step. Action proposals and commitments 
are still very vague and general in scope. However, except in the NDC of developed 
countries which offer little beyond an emission reduction target, subsidies appear to be 
among the policy instruments more likely to be used throughout the sample of NDC taken 
into consideration. In fact, commitments to promote or mainstream some sort of sustainable 
practice or technology, formulated in a variety of ways and which would easily allow for 
subsidies of some type, are present in most NDC. 
Canada, for instance, proposes to invest significantly in a low-carbon economy, green 
infrastructure and clean technology. China intends to make efforts to achieve zero growth of 
fertiliser and pesticide utilisation. Mexico wants to strengthen the diversification of 
sustainable agriculture. Vietnam has included the development of sustainable agriculture as 
a means for emission reduction. 
Under a climate perspective the subsidy issue looks different from the WTO approach of non-
discrimination and trade distortion avoidance. A more thorough examination of the Climate 
52 US – Upland Cotton (DS 267) 
53 US – Foreign Sales Corporation (DS 108) 
54 The Decision on Export Competition taken at the Tenth Ministerial Conference in Nairobi to abolish 
export subsidies for farm exports may also be relevant for other export competition instruments (cf. 
WT/MIN(15)/45 dated 21 December 2015). It is too early, however, to gauge whether climate 
measures will directly or indirectly benefit, or on the contrary be impeded, by this new discipline. 
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Change Tool Box for Agriculture (Box 1) definitely merits consideration if trade competition 
with subsidies alleging climate mitigation or adaptation is to be contained. The Paris peer 
review process might shed some light on some of these measures. Other international 
organisations like the FAO, UNCTAD, or the OECD, could also contribute with their means to 
the identification of climate-smart policies, standards – and subsidies. 
The key for an economic impact assessment of agricultural subsidies in a climate perspective 
would probably be the contribution of a ‚differentiating’ subsidy under the Paris Agreement. 
Here again, not everybody is equal. Some temperate climate countries may actually benefit 
from global warming, with little or no justification for a subsidy. Closer to the Equator, 
adaptation subsidies and ODA might find economic justification especially for farmers without 
meaningful support from their governments. 
4 Consumer Information 
WTO rules are to act as guardians against altering competitive conditions not only for 
regulating imports. WTO rules also impact on some of the simplest awareness-raising tools 
such as marketing and consumer information regulations. At least part of a country’s 
citizenship is likely to be open to what economists like to call 'nudging'. Hence, the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement may well motivate governments to prescribe certain 
types of labels, for instance by indicating the footprint of a particular product. Consumers 
can then take their purchase decisions and yet remain free to buy their preferred product. 
While nobody in the WTO questions consumer information as an objective, heated debates 
take place for specific labelling schemes, particularly in the TBT Committee. 
So far, no ‚climate label’ as a tool for an agricultural policy objective has come to the 
forefront in these debates. Of course, nudging works differently for climate concerns than 
for, say, smoking, animal health, child labour, or obesity prevention. But a plethora of recent 
labelling schemes introduced for public health purposes are perhaps an indication of how 
such issues might be treated under WTO rules and procedures. Boza and Espinoza (2016) 
describe the ‘specific trade concerns’ expressed by a number of country delegates in respect 
of a health-related label scheme notified by the Chilean government (see Window 2 below). 
The compulsory marking by way of ‚rotulos‘ for prepackaged food with high contents of 
calories, sodium, saturated fats and sugar was seen by other trade diplomats as ‚health 
warnings‘ representing technical trade barriers hardly compatible with the TBT Agreement.55 
55 The TBT Agreement tries to ensure that standards are genuinely useful, and not arbitrary or 
protectionist (Art. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4). These measures might be governmental regulations but also 
private norms adopted by national and international standard-setting bodies. The Code of Good 
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (TBT Annex 3) is a set of 
procedural rules which these bodies are encouraged to follow when they elaborate their standards. 
However, unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not refer to any specific international 
organisations or standards as guidance. Nonetheless, several TBT dispute settlement cases referred to 
such standards as an indication of a consensus on how to implement the underlying policy objective 
without erecting trade barriers. In this sense the TBT Agreement can be read as a useful guideline for 
national measures addressing the policy objective in a transparent and comprehensive way (Source, 
for this and for the debates on the Chilean 'rotulos': TBT Information Management System, available 
at http://tbtims.wto.org/) 
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The concerns expressed did not question the scientific justification of the levels triggering 
the labelling obligation, following recommendations by the WHO for the control and 
prevention of obesity. Rather, the proposed regulation was seen as modifying conditions of 
competition in favour of domestic producers and to the disadvantage of global brand 
operators. For instance, Australia noted that the application of a mandatory health message 
referring to levels of specific critical nutrients was not consistent with the principle of the 
Codex Alimentarius Guidelines on Nutrition Labelling that 'the information should not lead 
consumers to believe that there is exact quantitative knowledge of what individuals should 
eat in order to maintain health, but rather to convey an understanding of the quantity of 
nutrients contained in the product.' 
Window 2: Chile‘s Consumer Information Health Labels 
 
Source: Boza and Espinoza (2016) 
Notwithstanding widespread criticism, at home and in the WTO, Chile adopted the measure 
in 2016, after numerous TBT Committee Sessions in 2013, 2014 and 2015. So far, no formal 
complaint has been lodged in this case. Other countries, for instance Peru, are very likely to 
follow this type of health policy tool. Nonetheless, this example shows that measures with 
international implications and markets segmentation are not an easy road. Even a somewhat 
‚softer’ nudging tool like the ‚traffic-light labels’ indicating different energy efficiency of 
household appliances in Europe, took considerable time to gain acceptance, mainly because 
of non-transparent efficiency criteria. A UK Government project to introduce similar traffic 
lights, indicating health properties of breakfast cereals in 2018 met with considerable 
opposition by the European Dairy Association. And when Italy obliged food labels to indicate 
the name of the production factory, EU industry representatives protested. 
Explicit calls for increased consumer information and awareness appear sparsely in the 
publicly available NDC. A good example, again without providing too much detail, is Nigeria’s 
commitment to significantly increase public awareness and involve private sector 
participation. 
Without opining on the general WTO-compatibility of mandatory consumer information it 
seems obvious that labels providing consumers with, say, footprint information might face 
criticism in the WTO. As shown in Box 3, of the only two labelling cases ever brought to the 
DSB, both claiming to be trade-neutral consumer information labels, the first one was still 
pending at the time of writing this article. The second case ended with the respondent 
withdrawing the incriminated regulation in order to avoid retaliation. 
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Box 3: Consumer Information Measures with Mixed Results 
Case Number Respondent and 
(Short) Title  
Complainant  Current Status  
DS381 US — Tuna II Mexico On 26 October 2017, the 
Compliance Panels found the 
US 2016 Tuna Measure 
'calibrated' and thus, 
consistent with TBT-Article 
2.1., and justified under 
GATT-Article XX. Mexico 
appealed this ruling. 
DS384 + 386 United States — 
Certain Country of 
Origin Labelling 
(COOL) 
Requirements 
Canada and 
Mexico 
COOL legislation repealed on 
18 December 2015. 
 
 
Source: WTO Webpage https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm 
last accessed on 31 October 2017 
 
5 Risk Management, Risk Insurance and Climate Change Adaptation 
It is often stipulated that global warming and climate change bring about more, and more 
devastating, natural disasters. Hurricanes, typhoons and blizzards may occur with a higher 
intensity, more monsoon irregularities, rising sea levels due to melting glaciers and 
permafrost reduction. While a clear correlation is in many cases yet to be established, the 
main insurance and reinsurance companies are fully aware of this danger. Some have 
already reduced their risk exposure or increased their insurance premiums. Obviously, the 
not unlikely scenario of more rains falling at the wrong time and in the wrong places would 
impact especially on agriculture. 
This is not necessarily a problem for global food security, as long as climate change 
beneficiary farmers can compensate the production fall-outs. Demand-side measures to 
reduce demand especially in developed countries for ruminant livestock products remain a 
major challenge though, because some producers will inevitably go out of business but 
hopefully find remunerative alternatives. Hence, the food security issue to be addressed both 
under the Paris and the WTO Agreements is how mitigation can take place at local and 
national levels without driving producers out of business, and prices out of an affordable 
range. 
Responsible governments, at any rate, are re-examining their options. A variety of risk 
management instruments have been in use since many years, with public support 
especially for specific risks and risk management instruments. The classic example on the 
weather front is hail, frost and flood insurance allowing farmers to buy coverage for 
production losses beyond their control (Munroe 2017). Some (mainly developed) countries 
where prices are not fixed by the state offer insurance for many other risks as well, including 
disaster risks, domestic and export market price variations, drought, and bio-security. 
Presently, the main users appear to be the United States, China, Canada, Japan and Spain. 
Australia, New Zealand and The Netherlands are relatively small users, but they presently try 
to innovate for climate-related risks. The OECD describes some of these programmes under 
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its Risk Management Programme which also includes a number of agricultural production 
and marketing risks.56 OECD (2011) describes and assesses various national schemes in use, 
with a view to determining the importance of the subsidy element involved in just about 
each of the different risks addressed. Under the same programme Kimura and Le Thi (2011) 
tried to measure risk exposure at the farm level and to analyse farm behaviour and policy 
performance under variable risk conditions. Goodwin (2012) studied the 'harm' done by 
insurance schemes. It has often been noted that risk management attitudes vary with 
increasingly adverse weather conditions (Munroe 2017). Schoengold et al (2015) showed 
that Iowa farmers tend to take out more disaster and crop insurance instead of resorting to 
risk-reducing conservation tillage. 
Noteworthy among developing countries is the Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme in 
India, an index-based insurance programme introduced in 2007 which according to 
sources quoted by Glauber (2015) included more than 9 million Indian producers in 2010–
11, with a combined commercial premium volume of about USD 260 million. Joe Glauber 
also reports that global premium volumes are estimated to have increased at an annual rate 
of about 16 percent between 2004 and 2013. As shown in Box 4 the main users also notify 
to the WTO increasing amounts under their various agriculture-related risk insurance 
programmes – and under different WTO provisions. 
Box 4: Notification of agricultural insurance (selected countries, USD millions) 
 US Japan  Canada EU China India Brazil 
Notifi-
cation Amber 
Green/ 
Amber Amber Amber 
Not 
reported Green Green 
2008 -
2009 5,691 626 699 770 1,148 174 65 
2009 - 
2010 5,426 682 771 548 1,473 330 181 
2010 - 
2011 4,711 695 748 550 1,571 693 302 
2011 - 
2012 7,461 779 881 583 2,080 na 78 
2012 - 
2013 6,926 736 1,002 na 2,949 na  455 
Aver. 6,043 704 820 613 1,844 399 399 
Source: Glauber (2015), p.10, with WTO data as of 28 September 2015 
Note: na = not applicable 
An interesting scheme has been developed in drought-affected developing countries, 
whereby weather insurance is offered by local insurance in cooperation with meteorological 
institutions, NGO and international reinsurance companies. In Ethiopia, for instance, farmers 
unable to pay the premiums can acquire an insurance licence in public works projects in their 
region (‚work for insurance‘). (Häberli 2013) 
There is no insurance scheme against all facets of climate change. However, a rapid increase 
in weather insurance can be anticipated. And a multiple peril agricultural insurance also 
56 For all OECD Studies in Risk Management see 
http://www.oecd.org/futures/globalprospects/oecdstudiesinriskmanagement.htm (available on 20 
October 2017) 
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covering long term effects of climate change might well be in the offing – at what and whose 
cost is another question. Perhaps surprisingly, no INDC/NDC appears to report the various 
weather insurance schemes in place or envisaged in both developed and developing 
countries. One reference is China’s intention to ‚improve the green credit mechanisms, to 
encourage and guide financial institutions to operate energy-efficiency crediting business and 
to issue asset securitized products for green credit assets‘ – without specifications on how 
this will be implemented. 
In view of the additional and different risks climate change entails, some such instruments 
might well offer considerable advantages both for facilitating adaptation and for bridging 
repeated harvest losses. At the sometime, the economic rationale for such schemes should 
be studied carefully, also taking into account that poorer countries may not be able to 
compete here. But the question under a trade rules perspective is whether adaptation 
programmes, premium subsidies, or other forms of governmental help can be considered to 
distort trade. This is, not least, a question of the duration of the risk, and of the government 
support. A permanent support scheme would more likely fall into the Amber Box than 
punctual and time-limited production retirement and disaster relief programmes reducing the 
marketable production volumes. Such programmes may find coverage under the Green Box 
(and thus be available without a quantitative limit) provided the relevant conditions are met. 
For instance, three are numerous conditions for production loss insurance and income safety 
net programmes.57 Similar Green Box conditions apply to compensation for production losses 
of at least 30% due to large disasters. Finally, it should be noted that in order to qualify as a 
Green Box measure (not subject to limitations or reductions) all these programmes are 
subject to additional conditions. In particular, they are required to be ‘no or at most 
minimally’ trade distorting.58 
Accordingly, since 2012 the perhaps largest such program, the US Crop Insurance Support 
Program, has been notified to the WTO as (trade-distorting) ‘product-specific support.’ In 
combination with other large farm subsidies, such risk hedging schemes may exert ‘serious 
prejudice’ to foreign producers without insurance programmes. On the other hand, in the 
cotton case the Panel found that crop insurance alone did not contribute to serious 
prejudice, since losses were based on production rather than price various US farm support 
programmes. This ruling was not appealed, perhaps because those other programmes were 
found to encourage production and exports, with the result of driving down world market 
prices to the disadvantage of Brazil’s and other cotton producers.59 
Besides, the US Crop Insurance Support Program is related to world market price changes, 
not (directly) to weather risks. Joseph Glauber (2015) posits that risk management support 
is likely to fall into the category of trade-distorting instruments – the so-called ‘Amber Box.’ 
This does not mean they are prohibited; but the total public expenditures under all such 
programmes, or for a specific commodity, are limited – for all WTO Members. 
57 AoA Annex 2, paragraph 8  
58 According to Paragraph 1, domestic support measures claiming Green Box status “shall meet the 
fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production.” 
59 Cf. United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton (DS 267); Glauber (2015) p.17 
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Finally, looking at climate change adaptation measures, the NDC analysis of the FAO shows 
an interesting result (Benda and Zimmermann/FAO 2018). Presently, there is hardly any 
mention of adaptation measures in developed country NDC, as opposed to those of 
developing countries where they figure extensively. This might be due to the fact that 
developed countries benefit broadly speaking more often of a temperate climate, while many 
developing countries are more likely to suffer from extreme consequences of climate change. 
As a consequence, within many of the analysed developing country NDC, there is scope for 
potential risk management measures by way of adaptation programmes. 
The green credit mechanisms in China, and Armenia’s proposal for a climate change civil 
fund with an appropriate legislative institutional framework for adequate financial assistance, 
have been mentioned above. In a broader manner, Egypt for instance commits to building 
an effective institutional system to manage climate change associated crises and disaster. 
The increasing recourse to insurance, with public support, is likely to continue, including in 
the name of climate change. Like for subsidies, economists might also point out that disaster 
insurance as an adaptation tool would not be eo ipso climate smart if it creates incentives for 
farmers to stay producing in zones where production becomes less feasible, in the long term, 
due to climate change. 
5. Conclusions: Act Carefully but Rapidly 
This article tried to show which trade rules might matter for what kind of climate measures. 
The main criteria for a legal assessment under the multilateral trade framework of the WTO 
remain the positive or negative discriminatory elements of a measure, inasmuch as they 
modify the conditions of competition. This means that for instance, climate impact 
considerations would matter only for the assessment of a legal defence e.g. under GATT-
Article XX. However, recent case law appears to leave more room for a holistic approach. For 
instance, the efficiency and effectiveness of technical regulations, e.g. in terms of carbon 
footprint reductions, can now taken into consideration in order to validate an exception to a 
rules violation. To take the example of a technical regulation, a 'legitimate regulatory 
distinction' is now a sufficient condition to justify e.g. a rules violation under the basic 
conditions of TBT-Art. 2.2.60 As for an impact assessment of a consumer information label, 
both cases described in Box 3 innovated. In US – COOL the Panel found that additional costs 
due to the measure did not have to fall equally on foreign and domestic products. In the (not 
yet final) compliance procedure for US – Tuna II the Panel clarified that a regulation 
'calibrated' to the risk of non-fulfilment could meet the condition of being 'not more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.' 
60 'Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view 
to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, 
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, 
taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: 
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or 
safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of 
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing 
technology or intended end-uses of products.' 
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Despite these new developments in adjudication, the ground rules remain unchanged. WTO 
dispute settlement still serves to preserve the WTO rights and obligations of Members.61 It 
has been argued that no WTO ruling has ever contributed to a violation of human rights 
violations, and that 'pragmatic solutions' were found for access to medicines and blood 
diamonds (Petersmann 2009:76). Gabrielle Marceau (2006) consistently emphasises that a 
good faith interpretation of WTO rules will in many cases allow for a ‘coherent reading’ with 
human rights. 
Absent a valid exception (i.e. an interpretation by the General Council, an amendment, or a 
time-limited waiver), many measures claiming to implement the Paris commitments may 
appear problematic under the present trade rules. Any country feeling discriminated against 
can instigate dispute settlement procedures. And if a rules violation is established, the 
adjudicator (Panel or AB) has to issue a ruling which will be endorsed by the DSB, calling 
upon the respondent to comply. In the (rare) cases of non-compliance, the complainant has 
the right to 'retaliate' by withdrawing a concession of substantially equal value to its trade 
losses. 
Other climate-related issues such as the renewable energy disputes listed in Box 2 show an 
emerging case law applying the trade rules in ‘splendid isolation’ – mostly without admitting 
WTO exceptions as a valid defence. Despite having the duty, recognised by the AB, to 
examine violation claims, and defences, other than under WTO Law, no adjudicator has ever 
found peremptory public international law (ius cogens) to overrule WTO Law. The lack of 
specific and clearly climate-related obligations, or mandatory international standards in 
multilateral environmental agreements, including the Paris Agreement, makes the case of a 
respondent invoking such provisions very difficult. 
For agriculture, specific climate-related measures are yet to be notified to the WTO. There is 
no directly relevant case law. Moreover, climate-smart agricultural standards and practices 
are still to be developed at the international level. The available INDC and NDC provide little 
more than a number of possible avenues where developing and developed countries declare 
their intention to reduce GHG production along the food value chain. The Paris process 
should thus be seen both as a challenge and an opportunity for policy-makers, as well as for 
national and international standard development, and for shaping producer and consumer 
behaviour. 
Our overview shows that the agricultural chapters in the already available NDC do contain a 
few pathways and objectives (let alone notifications of climate-related policy reforms to the 
WTO), albeit only a few concrete examples of actual GHG reduction measures. It is therefore 
neither appropriate nor possible to reach a general assessment of these measures under a 
trade rules perspective. Nevertheless, the agricultural NDC chapters are considered as 
essential components informing the ‘Climate Change Toolbox for Agriculture’ containing 
61 Art. 3.2 (emphasis added): ‚The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to 
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.‘ 
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many national measures for climate change mitigation (Box 1). They also indicate, at a very 
general level, some of the issues possibly arising in an agricultural trade and investment 
context. 
Without a complainant there is no judge, and no ruling. Legal opinions in respect of trade 
issues, even case law, cannot predict failure of a specific climate-smart agricultural policy 
measure, nor are they a safe conduit ensuring success in case of a dispute. 
The ‘Climate vs WTO Challenge’ is to provide legal security for the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement. Maximum policy space for climate mitigation and adaptation is of utmost 
importance. At the same time, national measures should not negatively impact on other 
countries, or unduly restrict trade and investment, especially in poor developing countries. 
The crucial question for the examination of all relevant WTO rules proposed here is which 
tools in the climate change toolbox might be those with the least trade frictions, ands which 
tools might require clarifications, interpretations, amendments or waivers. 
Clearly, there are WTO un-problematic policy areas and measures. Secondly, there is no 
problem with self-discrimination i.e. obligations imposed on national producers only, without 
BAM applying similar footprints requirements to foreign suppliers – as long as the usually 
accompanying financial compensations do not unduly impair trade or displace imports. And, 
thirdly, all WTO agreements contain general as well as development-specific flexibilities, 
even though none seems to allow the type of differentiation between otherwise ‘like’ 
products and services implicitly mandated by Paris. 
This development dimension appears as another blind spot under the multilateral trade rules. 
Rich countries and those with small farming sectors obviously are in a different position in 
their choice than poor countries, especially those with a high relative footprint in terms of 
output units, as is often the case for small and subsistence farmers, nomads, and fishermen. 
Put simply, a draft animal produces more methane than a tractor. The same goes for a 
suckling cow compared with a hyper-performing animal, in terms of meat and milk output 
per unit of methane (CH4). Unfortunately, while the Paris Agreement obliges all countries to 
take the development dimension into account when formulating their NDC, it does not 
indicate which policy tools are really climate-smart or development-friendly, or both. 
This leaves the trade community with a task it has not yet started to seriously examine, let 
alone negotiate. True, there are a number of exceptions to all general and specific trade 
rules. They are regularly used in litigation, including GATT-Article XX for environment and 
natural resource protection, health, and public morals, Article XXI for national security, and 
Article XVIII for infant industry protection. The official description of all SDT provisions 
reflecting WTO development concerns and flexibilities took 130 pages back in 2001. 
However, this article posits that, generally speaking, these provisions and defences may be 
good for preventing trade distortions, or improving developing country market access, or 
alleviate structural adjustment pains – but they do not allow for permanently ‚differentiated‘ 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
What can be done? For instance, should a ‘Paris waiver’ be added to the list of measures in 
GATT-Article XX? And, provided such a mile change is feasible, would the very restrictive 
‘chapeau’ of that article leave sufficient policy space for at least those measures which are 
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devoid of major trade distortions? Are the SDT provisions in the relevant WTO agreements 
sufficient to give poor developing countries, and their large emitters, adequate farm support 
tools, and effective market access for their climate-smart export products? 
This article can only show the potential problems of some of the envisaged measures. At this 
stage of NDC development, trade problems are theoretically possible for three main types of 
measures: 
1 Support for only national producers embracing GHG reducing production when such 
subsidies not only compensate for the disadvantage vis-à-vis other national producers 
but also enhancing export competition or import displacement. 
2 Border measures for only climate-‘unfriendly’ products and production methods, 
whether or not they increase WTO-agreed tariff maxima. 
3 Consumer information schemes like government-regulated labels indicating product 
footprint. 
So far, the WTO comitology has failed to address such problems in any detail. Besides, some 
of these problems would also appear to call for a similar reflection in respect of international 
investment treaties, regional trade agreements, and sectorial agreements on energy, 
aviation, water management, shipping, fishing and migration. In addition, in order to fulfil 
the Paris-enshrined Development Dimension, various types of preferential treatment for 
climate-friendly products and processing methods from developing countries would also have 
to be re-evaluated. 
Pending a serious exercise of reflection by the trading community, in association with the 
national and international climate change stakeholders, it is difficult to propose solutions in 
concrete terms. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this article may contribute to ending the 
affirmation by politicians and diplomats, up and including at the COP21 meeting in Paris, that 
environment and trade policies are eo ipso ‘mutually supportive’. The both ambitious and 
urgent reflection (and possibly negotiation) proposed here would allow to identify policy 
areas and measures 
1 where quick solutions for possible conflicts might be available 
2 where a review of trade rules (or waivers thereof) and available international 
standards might be necessary 
3 with some early indications of how this could be done: inter-institutional cooperation 
and procedures, academic support, and interagency government delegations’ 
involvement at the international level. 
This article concludes with a tentative list of WTO rules where minimally trade-impacting 
adjustments might be considered (i) applying to all countries or (ii) exclusively to poor 
developing countries (Box 5). This list is not a carte blanche for climate action by any means. 
For instance, a carbon tax might be less climate-smart, yet more trade-restrictive, than a 
subsidised sequestration programme. Similarly, the present boom in risk insurance schemes 
with government support may have adverse effects on judicious risk taking by operators, 
without additional benefits for more climate mitigation or food security. Nonetheless, WTO 
would be ill-placed to refuse a debate on the climate tool list, and on the suggested rules 
review, just for its own dogmatic reasons. The last three Ministerial Conferences almost 
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failed because the food stockpile issue was not dealt with seriously and with an 
understanding of the different interests at stake (Galtier 2017).62 Now is perhaps the time for 
a new effort to look beyond trade and economic but non-sustainable growth. 
As for the development dimension, extreme care is warranted in addressing this issue, 
knowing that all GHG emissions have global, not merely national, effects. For instance, it can 
be argued that to exclude middle-income and large developing countries may be justifiable 
on the basis of the need to contain the potential proliferation of trade distortions due to 
climate polices (in addition to any other considerations, e.g., equity). On the other hand, 
inaction by large GHG emitters (at any level of development) can have a very serious impact 
on global warming. These considerations would seem to indicate a need for extreme caution, 
and possibly an ad hoc approach with different thresholds, for each climate-motivated 
exception to the trade rules. 
This is not a work programme. But considering that up to nineteen agreements and other 
texts might be concerned by the ‘Climate vs WTO Challenge’, and that the Paris/NDC process 
requires a rapid development of mitigation and adaptation measures, it seems obvious that 
work in the WTO constituency and beyond should start as soon as possible. However, some 
key issues identified in this article also require progress in the climate fora (COP) and on the 
development side (SDG). Intergovernmental work, in parallel and on all fronts, could lead to 
a trade- and development-friendly framework for the elaboration of climate-smart policies 
under the Paris Agreement. On 14 November 2017 the COP23 decided to 'address issues 
related to agriculture, [...] taking into consideration the vulnerabilities of agriculture to 
climate change and approaches to addressing food security.' (UNFCCC/IPCC 2017) This 
(draft) decision would seem to indicate an acknowledgement that turning a blind eye to this 
sector which is key for food security and for development, is no longer possible. If countries 
are to move forward with the implementation of policies that are both effective in achieving 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, while at the same time meeting other 
international objectives (i.e. a level-playing field for trade, and SDG fulfilment) this will need 
to be addressed without further ado. 
Climate change is likely to affect agricultural production, as we today know it, even more 
than other sectors. And small producers in poor developing countries – in fact, the majority 
of the world’s farmers – may well be among those facing the biggest problems in the 
absence of efficient, effective, and climate- and trade-friendly solutions. 
Box 5: WTO Rules and Possibly Necessary Adjustments Allow ing for Trade-
Friendly Climate Action 
WTO 
Texts (in 
alphabetical 
order) 
Adjustments to be considered “without more than a minimal trade impact” 
 for all WTO Members 
 only for poor developing 
countries and measures 
62 Franck Galtier analyses what he calls the ‚biases in current WTO rules for estimating the support 
provided to farmers through public stockholding programmes‘ and proposes to correct these biases by 
the ‚right metrics on the support provided to farmers through public stockholding programmes’, both 
under the AoA and the SCM. 
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AoA 
Annex 2 (‘Green Box’): to add a paragraph 
14 allowing for efficient and effective 
climate mitigation support measures 
based on internationally recognised 
standards (e.g. best agricultural 
practices), at levels with no more than a 
minimal impact on trade and production. 
Art. 6.2 (Developing Country Green Box) 
to be generally and permanently 
available for clearly climate-friendly 
investments and risk management, such 
as for drought management, flood 
control, and soil management, including 
certain credit schemes and subsidies e.g. 
for irrigation construction, and certain 
agricultural input subsidies for low-
income or resource-poor producers. 
ADP 
Anti-dumping disallowed for 
internationally recognised climate-smart 
action as long as a subsidy or other 
incentives to a given product from a 
particular exporting country do not over-
compensate the additional production 
costs due to the climate-smart action at 
issue. Anti-dumping is also disallowed 
where the importing country applies an 
equivalent climate-smart measure. (Art. 
3.5 for causation analysis) 
 
DSU 
Adjudicators to consider context and 
customary international law (as per Art. 
31 VCLT) and not to rule out Paris 
Agreement implementation measures 
where the underlying climate change 
mitigation objective cannot be attained 
otherwise than with a minimal trade 
distortion. 
 
GATT 
1. No WTO rules shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement 
of measures necessary for 
implementing the Paris Agreement 
(e.g. for the internalisation of GHG 
reduction costs). WTO Members shall 
benefit from a new provision in GATT-
Article XX (lit. k), mutatis mutandis 
subject to the provisions in the 
chapeau of Article XX, and taking into 
consideration the above-suggested 
DSU modification (establishing 
‘necessity’). The main rules for which 
such an exception might be needed 
are found in Articles I, III:2 and III:4 
of the GATT 1994; GATT-Article XXIII 
(‚non-violation‘) might also need to be 
reviewed.63 
2. GHG emission pricing schemes and 
‘other duties or charges’ levied on 
Reintroduce clearly defined infant 
industry protection for climate-friendly 
start-ups in poor developing countries 
(Art. XVIII GATT). 
63 A ‚non-violation‘ scenario could be imagined for a Paris-related measure with only an indirect trade 
impact, and without an infringement of WTO Law. The so-called ‚non-violation claim‘ provision in 
GATT-Article XXIII allows an adjudicator to outlaw (and to authorise retaliation against) even a 
measure not found to be formally violating any WTO rules and commitments. The respondent, in such 
a case, would then have to revise the incriminated measure and grant full market access to the 
foreign good or service. Whether any measure in the ‚Climate Tool Box‘ would fulfill the criteria is 
doubtful. But, given the dearth of case law for this provision, such a scenario is at any rate rather 
unlikely. 
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non-climate-smart imports may 
exceed scheduled tariff rates (Art. 
II:1(b) GATT). 
GATS 
1. Foreign agricultural service suppliers, 
for instance the so-called ‘services 
incidental to agriculture’ (CPC 881), 
may invoke their MFN and 
(scheduled) NT rights under Articles II 
and XVII only if their climate-
impacting performance is at least 
equivalent to that required from 
domestic service suppliers. 
2. Same condition to apply mutatis 
mutandis to claims in respect of 
scheduled commitments by individual 
members in specific sectors e.g. for 
market access restrictions based on 
the total value of service transactions 
or assets. 
3. Article XIV (General Exceptions) to be 
modified like Article XX GATT. 
Review the (generally low) specific 
services commitments offered to poor 
developing countries under GATS-
Articles XVI – XVIII. 
GPA 
Entities covered by this Agreement may 
apply internationally recognised climate 
standards and best agricultural practices 
for products or services procurement (e.g. 
equivalent footprint requirements). 
For climate-friendly products and 
services procurement, Article V (Special 
and Differential Treatment for 
Developing Countries) shall be available 
for poor developing countries only. 
LIC 
Import approvals and controls for climate-
related regulations based on international 
standards and best agricultural practices 
to be ‘automatic’ import licenses i.e. 
assumed not to have trade restrictive 
effects (Art. 2). 
 
NFIDC  
Decision  
Negative effects of climate adjustment 
measures on NFIDC trade entitles 
affected developing countries to 
compensatory support by countries 
implementing such climate measures. 
PSI  
Import controls by way of pre-shipment 
inspection of climate-friendly goods and 
services to be facilitated with the 
support of the importing country. 
RoO 
Pending the long-term harmonisation of 
non-preferential rules of origin, the rules 
of origin for environmental goods and 
services should be based on a positive 
standard (rather than stating what does 
not confer origin). 
 
Safeguards 
Clearly climate-related prudential carve-
outs e.g. for financial services to be 
shielded from safeguard complaints. 
Review the justification for developing 
country rights to extend the period of 
application of a climate-related 
safeguard measure for a period of 
(presently) only two years beyond the 
normal maximum. 
GATT Tariff 
Schedules 
Principal suppliers and suppliers with 
substantial trade interests to favourably 
consider requests for bound tariff 
increases for climate-sensitive goods (and 
other duties and charges applying to ‘like’ 
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products), and proposals for substantially 
equivalent concessions initially negotiated 
with the applicant Member under Article 
XXVIII GATT. 
SCM 
1. Agricultural subsidies and other 
incentives provided in the context of 
the Paris Agreement implementation 
shall be assumed, under the SCM 
Agreement, to not have ‘adverse 
effects’ on other WTO Members as 
long as they are clearly based on 
internationally recognised standards 
(e.g. best agricultural practices). 
2. Consumer subsidies and import 
substitution subsidies for climate-
friendly products could be challenged 
as actionable subsidies under the SCM 
Agreement (and countervailed if there 
are exports) only if they involve trade 
restrictions (Sykes 2015). 
3. Fisheries (and shipping) subsidy rules 
may require specific adjustments. 
[Consider Art. 15.5 for causation analysis] 
1. Measures taken to implement the 
Technology Mechanism under the 
Paris Agreement (Art. 9) to be 
considered SCM-compatible. 
2. Climate-exposed small fishermen 
and aquaculture in poor countries to 
benefit similarly to production 
support under Article 6.2 AoA. 
SPS 
WHO recommendations for climate-smart 
health policies to be considered SPS-
compatible similarly to the standards laid 
down for agricultural trade by the Codex 
alimentarius, IPPC and OIE (Art. 3.4 and 
Annex A para 3 SPS). 
 
TBT 
Provided treatment is granted to foreign 
products no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national 
origin and to like products originating in 
any other country: 
1. Climate-related conformity 
assessment procedures, and 
requirements for quantification and 
reporting of greenhouse gas 
emissions and reductions based e.g. 
on relevant ISO standards, to be 
assumed to fulfil a legitimate objective 
in the sense of Article 2.2 TBT. 
2. Labelling of climate-sensitive products 
and best agricultural practices to be 
assumed to fulfil a legitimate objective 
in the sense of Article 2.2 TBT. 
 
TRIMS  
Poor developing countries to benefit 
from a time-limited right to restrict 
trade, by way of a local content 
requirement, as an incentive for climate-
friendly investment promotion. 
TRIPS  
Measures taken to implement the 
Technology Transfer Mechanism under 
the Paris Agreement (Art. 10) to be 
considered TRIPS-compatible. 
TFA 
Disciplines e.g. for enhanced controls or 
inspections (Art. 5.1) to apply to ‘Paris’ 
implementation measures. 
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VAL  
Provisions relevant to developing 
countries and relating to minimum 
values and importations by sole agents, 
sole distributors and sole dealers to also 
apply to product differentiation 
necessary for the Paris Agreement 
implementation. 
Source: Häberli (2016), here adjusted for NDC analysis 
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